UNIVERSITY TEACHING
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COURSE DESIGN & DELIVERY
Undergraduate lecture on “The historiography of Greek philosophy in the context of the global history of philosophy” Faculty of Classics, Cambridge: Lent Term 2025 (upcoming)
Part of the 'Classics Now' 1st-year (Part 1A) undergraduate lecture series Undergraduate lectures on Scepticism in the Global History of Philosophy
Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford: Hilary Term 2023 Undergraduate lecture series covering core themes in the history of scepticism in ancient Greek philosophy, classical Chinese and Indian philosophy, mediaeval Islamic philosophy, and early modern European and African philosophy (4 50-minute lectures). See details below. One-on-one teaching:
Classical Chinese Philosophy (Analects, Mozi, Mengzi, Xunzi, Laozi & Excavated Manuscripts, Zhuangzi, Sunzi, Han Feizi) - Mansfield College, Oxford: Hilary Term 2022 (8 tutorials) - Wadham College, Oxford: Hilary Term 2021 (7 tutorials) Designed and taught an 8-week programme of study for 2 visiting students Small-group teaching:
Introduction to Chinese Philosophy Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford: Michaelmas Term 2019 Designed and taught an introductory programme of study for the entire cohort of 1st-year undergraduates in Chinese (4 tutorials) |
FACULTY TEACHING
Translation classes:
Early Philosophical Texts translation: Mengzi and Xunzi Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford: Michaelmas Term 2019 (7 2-hour classes) Ran a 7-week philosophical discussion and translation course (Classical Chinese - English) on two classical Confucian texts: Mengzi and Xunzi - aimed at fourth year undergraduates in Chinese |
BA DISSERTATION SUPERVISION
Comparative study of the Zhuangzi and Camus
Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Oxford: 2020-1 4th-year undergraduate in Chinese (8 supervisions) |
TUTORIALS / SUPERVISIONS
Hellenistic Philosophy
Peterhouse, Cambridge: Easter Term 2024 (1 revision supervision) Plato's Phaedo
Peterhouse, Cambridge; Trinity College, Cambridge; Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge: Lent Term 2024 (5 supervisions) Introduction to Greek and Roman Philosophy
Peterhouse, Cambridge: Michaelmas Term 2023 (1 supervision) Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
St Edmund Hall, Oxford: Trinity Term 2023 (4 tutorials) Plato's Euthyphro and Meno
St John's College, Oxford; Corpus Christi College, Oxford; Regent's Park College, Oxford: Trinity Term 2023 (16 tutorials) Early Greek Philosophy (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Atomists)
University College, Oxford: Michaelmas Term 2019 (8 tutorials), Michaelmas Term 2020 (8 tutorials) |
REVISION CLASSES
Hellenistic Philosophy Peterhouse, Cambridge: Easter Term 2024 (1 supervision)
Early Greek Philosophy
University College, Oxford: Hilary Term 2021 (2 classes) |
OTHER TEACHING
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SECONDARY SCHOOL CLASSES
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TUTORING
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Designed and taught a 2-part ‘Introduction to Comparative Methodology & Classical Chinese Philosophy’ programme of teaching
ASDAN China online programme, Mansfield College, Oxford: February 2022 (4 2-hour classes) |
Volunteer one-to-one tutoring focusing on GCSE English for disadvantaged students
Jacari, Oxford: academic year 2017-8 |
TEACHING SYLLABI & HANDOUTS
'Scepticism in the Global History of Philosophy' Lectures (Hilary Term 2023, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford)
Are things really as they seem? Can I be certain about anything? Does the external world exist? Can I know other minds? Can I be sure about my own existence? Can I know that I know – or that I don’t know? How can I adjudicate between different views about how things are? In this lecture series, we will consider how to approach these foundational epistemological questions by attending to sceptical themes, ideas, arguments, and thought experiments found in ancient Greek philosophy, classical Chinese and Indian philosophy, medieval Islamic philosophy, and early modern European and African philosophy. In doing so, we will assess the extent to which looking to the history of philosophy – including to a range of traditions currently marginalized from the mainstream ‘canon’ – can help illuminate and complement relevant debates in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Course outline
Lecture 1 - Dreaming, Meditating, Introspecting: Introduction to Sceptical Themes
In this first lecture, we begin by considering contemporary debates relating to external world scepticism with reference to René Descartes’ (1596-1650) First Meditation and Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī's (1058–1111) Rescuer from Error. We consider the philosophical background for their common quest for certain knowledge, and consider their shared use of the genre of intellectual autobiography as a medium for generating sceptical arguments, including as regards (i) the evidence of the senses and (ii) mathematical truths. We also consider their common appeal to Dreaming Arguments to buttress their sceptical challenge, noting important differences in their argumentative strategies and intellectual motivations. Finally, we consider the hypothesis of (indirect) historical influence between al-Ghazālī and Descartes, and identify possible common sources of influence stretching back to Greek antiquity, particularly in the sceptical and medical traditions.
Lecture handout here.
Lecture 2 - The scope of Scepticism: Self-awareness as a Way Out?
In this lecture, we consider strategies for circumscribing sceptical doubt by focusing on notions of introspection, subjective experience, and the self. We more specifically consider the hypothesis that self-awareness might constitute a way out of - or a powerful antidote to - radical sceptical doubt. In this connection, we consider Abū-ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn-ʿAbdallāh Ibn-Sīnā’s (c. 970-1037) Floating Man thought experiment and Descartes’ 'cogito' argument in turn. Both suggest that the mind has a non-sensory, intellectual capacity for knowledge acquisition which we can intuitively tap into, and which is entirely independent of the body. Drawing on the thought of the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250 CE), we consider possible objections to these kinds of approaches, focusing on the weight they place on introspection and subjective experience, and on the assumptions they make about personal identity.
Lecture handout here.
Lecture 3 - From Relativism to Scepticism
In this lecture, we explore the conceptual links between relativism and scepticism, noting how the relativity of perception, customs, norms, religious views, etc. has historically tended to motivate or foreground sceptical views across a range of philosophical traditions. We first attend to relativist arguments in thinkers drawn to ‘local’ or circumscribed forms of scepticism. A famous example is the early Greek philosopher Xenophanes’ (late 6th-early 5th cent. BCE) account of the divergent theological views of Ethiopians and Thracians and his reductio ad absurdum involving conflicting non-human animal perspectives on the gods. We then consider the early modern Ethiopian philosopher Zera Yacob's (1599-1692) lament that while my own religion might seem true to me, so too will another’s religion seem true to him – so that religious disagreements might seem intractable in the absence of an impartial ‘judge’. We will see that Zera Yacob does not thereby endorse cultural relativism, but, in a familiar move among 17th century rationalists, instead invests the shared inborn human faculty of reason with the authority to adjudicate rationally between conflicting views. We then consider how more radically sceptical interlocutors from antiquity - notably the Pyrrhonian sceptic Sextus Empiricus (2nd or 3rd cent. CE) and the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi (c. 4th century BCE) - would have found such a move wanting, given their scepticism even about the reliability and impartiality of reason itself. Finally, having briefly considered the ways in which Sextus built on but also importantly departed from earlier sceptical trends in Greek philosophy, we consider the hypothesis of historical influence between Indian philosophy and (post-)Hellenistic Greek scepticism starting with Pyrrho (c. 365-c. 275 BCE), the putative founder of Pyrrhonian scepticism who reportedly travelled to India.
Lecture handout here.
Lecture 4 - Expressing and Vindicating Scepticism
This final lecture considers the puzzles involved in expressing and defending a radically sceptical stance. We distinguish between two kinds of radical or ‘global’ scepticism, and consider the puzzles to which they each give rise: declarative or dogmatic scepticism on the one hand – amounting to a wholesale (and affirmative) disavowal of knowledge – and interrogative scepticism on the other – which remains agnostic even about the question whether knowledge is possible and refrains from making any dogmatic pronouncements, including as to the correctness of the sceptical approach, or as to the reliability of words and arguments, etc. We consider Sextus' attack on brands of negative dogmatism which he associated with e.g. Academic Scepticism, and then turn our attention to Zhuangzi's own circumspect sceptical stance, which, like Sextus, avoids signing up to views about how things are and about what can (and cannot) be known. Here we draw on the literature in both contemporary epistemology and ancient philosophy, especially Mackie (1964), Burnyeat (1976), and Castagnoli (2010), to disambiguate different kinds of self-refutation: namely, pragmatic self-refutation, operational self-refutation, and absolute self-refutation. We consider whether radical sceptics like Sextus and Zhuangzi can anticipate or sidestep these kinds of charges, and if not, whether this has fatal consequences for their scepticism.
Lecture handout here.
Are things really as they seem? Can I be certain about anything? Does the external world exist? Can I know other minds? Can I be sure about my own existence? Can I know that I know – or that I don’t know? How can I adjudicate between different views about how things are? In this lecture series, we will consider how to approach these foundational epistemological questions by attending to sceptical themes, ideas, arguments, and thought experiments found in ancient Greek philosophy, classical Chinese and Indian philosophy, medieval Islamic philosophy, and early modern European and African philosophy. In doing so, we will assess the extent to which looking to the history of philosophy – including to a range of traditions currently marginalized from the mainstream ‘canon’ – can help illuminate and complement relevant debates in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of mind.
Course outline
Lecture 1 - Dreaming, Meditating, Introspecting: Introduction to Sceptical Themes
In this first lecture, we begin by considering contemporary debates relating to external world scepticism with reference to René Descartes’ (1596-1650) First Meditation and Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī's (1058–1111) Rescuer from Error. We consider the philosophical background for their common quest for certain knowledge, and consider their shared use of the genre of intellectual autobiography as a medium for generating sceptical arguments, including as regards (i) the evidence of the senses and (ii) mathematical truths. We also consider their common appeal to Dreaming Arguments to buttress their sceptical challenge, noting important differences in their argumentative strategies and intellectual motivations. Finally, we consider the hypothesis of (indirect) historical influence between al-Ghazālī and Descartes, and identify possible common sources of influence stretching back to Greek antiquity, particularly in the sceptical and medical traditions.
Lecture handout here.
Lecture 2 - The scope of Scepticism: Self-awareness as a Way Out?
In this lecture, we consider strategies for circumscribing sceptical doubt by focusing on notions of introspection, subjective experience, and the self. We more specifically consider the hypothesis that self-awareness might constitute a way out of - or a powerful antidote to - radical sceptical doubt. In this connection, we consider Abū-ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn-ʿAbdallāh Ibn-Sīnā’s (c. 970-1037) Floating Man thought experiment and Descartes’ 'cogito' argument in turn. Both suggest that the mind has a non-sensory, intellectual capacity for knowledge acquisition which we can intuitively tap into, and which is entirely independent of the body. Drawing on the thought of the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250 CE), we consider possible objections to these kinds of approaches, focusing on the weight they place on introspection and subjective experience, and on the assumptions they make about personal identity.
Lecture handout here.
Lecture 3 - From Relativism to Scepticism
In this lecture, we explore the conceptual links between relativism and scepticism, noting how the relativity of perception, customs, norms, religious views, etc. has historically tended to motivate or foreground sceptical views across a range of philosophical traditions. We first attend to relativist arguments in thinkers drawn to ‘local’ or circumscribed forms of scepticism. A famous example is the early Greek philosopher Xenophanes’ (late 6th-early 5th cent. BCE) account of the divergent theological views of Ethiopians and Thracians and his reductio ad absurdum involving conflicting non-human animal perspectives on the gods. We then consider the early modern Ethiopian philosopher Zera Yacob's (1599-1692) lament that while my own religion might seem true to me, so too will another’s religion seem true to him – so that religious disagreements might seem intractable in the absence of an impartial ‘judge’. We will see that Zera Yacob does not thereby endorse cultural relativism, but, in a familiar move among 17th century rationalists, instead invests the shared inborn human faculty of reason with the authority to adjudicate rationally between conflicting views. We then consider how more radically sceptical interlocutors from antiquity - notably the Pyrrhonian sceptic Sextus Empiricus (2nd or 3rd cent. CE) and the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi (c. 4th century BCE) - would have found such a move wanting, given their scepticism even about the reliability and impartiality of reason itself. Finally, having briefly considered the ways in which Sextus built on but also importantly departed from earlier sceptical trends in Greek philosophy, we consider the hypothesis of historical influence between Indian philosophy and (post-)Hellenistic Greek scepticism starting with Pyrrho (c. 365-c. 275 BCE), the putative founder of Pyrrhonian scepticism who reportedly travelled to India.
Lecture handout here.
Lecture 4 - Expressing and Vindicating Scepticism
This final lecture considers the puzzles involved in expressing and defending a radically sceptical stance. We distinguish between two kinds of radical or ‘global’ scepticism, and consider the puzzles to which they each give rise: declarative or dogmatic scepticism on the one hand – amounting to a wholesale (and affirmative) disavowal of knowledge – and interrogative scepticism on the other – which remains agnostic even about the question whether knowledge is possible and refrains from making any dogmatic pronouncements, including as to the correctness of the sceptical approach, or as to the reliability of words and arguments, etc. We consider Sextus' attack on brands of negative dogmatism which he associated with e.g. Academic Scepticism, and then turn our attention to Zhuangzi's own circumspect sceptical stance, which, like Sextus, avoids signing up to views about how things are and about what can (and cannot) be known. Here we draw on the literature in both contemporary epistemology and ancient philosophy, especially Mackie (1964), Burnyeat (1976), and Castagnoli (2010), to disambiguate different kinds of self-refutation: namely, pragmatic self-refutation, operational self-refutation, and absolute self-refutation. We consider whether radical sceptics like Sextus and Zhuangzi can anticipate or sidestep these kinds of charges, and if not, whether this has fatal consequences for their scepticism.
Lecture handout here.